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All the Turns in »Aestheticizing« Life
I
I find th a t I m ust begin at a g reat distance from  the question of aestheticizing 
o rd inary  life. Bear with m e, the gap closes o f its own accord.
M odernity  -  or, b e tte r, tha t late phase o f m odernity, o u r own time at 
the close o f  the  century, som etim es dubbed  postm odernity  -  is a time o f the 
g re a te s t crisis a n d  se lf-doub t am ong  the  cu ltu res o f  th e  m o d ern  West. 
C erta in ly , it m an ifests  itse lf  a lready  in  th e  la te  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  in 
N ietzsche’s im probab le  p ro n o u n cem en t, concocted in a S chopenhaurean  
d ream , in The Birth o f Tragedy: that is, the ensorcelled O edipal w arning about 
the m ean ing  o f the m eaninglessness o f life that plays itself o u t from The Birth 
o f Tragedy to The Gay Science to The Genealogy o f Morals, Beyond Good and Evil, 
dow n to the posthum ous The Will to Power. In all o f this, N ietzsche deepens 
his original inquiry -  beyond all rational resolution -  regarding the condition 
for »p rom oting  [what h e  calls] the faith  in life.«1 W hatever succeeds in this 
way ex tends an d  transform s the accoun t o f tragedy (as m uch on the comic 
side as th e  tragic). But what, m ore ominously, N ietzsche claims to detect 
th rough  his various genealogies or deconstructions of morality, is this: »What 
will n o t be  b u ilt any m ore hencefo rth , and  cannot be built anym ore, is [he 
says] -  a society in the  old sense o f tha t word: to build that, everything is 
lacking, above all the  m ateria l. A ll o f us are no longer material for a society: 
this is a tru th  fo r w hich the  tim e has come. It is a m atter o f indifference to 
m e [he adds] tha t a t p re sen t the m ost myopic, perhaps m ost honest, b u t a t 
any ra te noisiest h u m an  type tha t we have today, our good  socialists, believe, 
h o p e , d ream , an d  above all shou t and  write alm ost the opposite.«2
T his is the  setting  fo r the read ing  (advanced n o t m any years ago by 
A lexander N eham as) in w hich Nietzsche is said to aestheticize morality, to 
tu rn  to  the aestheticism  o f his own life shaped as a work o f art against the
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 
Bk. I, §1 (p. 74).
2 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bk. V, §356 (p. 304).
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futility o f all the usual forms of politics an d  m orality -  perhaps even a hopeful 
exem plar for the rest o f us.3
W hat N ietzsche m eans h e re  -  I d a re  su p p o se  -  is th a t  th e  h u m a n  
preoccupation  with our own words and  theories, which ho ld  to th e ir d ee p e r 
life-affirm ing function  chiefly in the  g rea tes t o f  the  arts, is now  p erh ap s 
p e rm a n e n tly  risk e d  (as th e  e x a m p le  o f  th e  l ib e ra l ,  r a t io n a l ,  a n d  
lite ralm inded  socialists confirm ). T he aestheticizing o f  life, in N ietzsche’s 
m ost original sense, transform ed from  S ch o p en h a u er’s, repairs as well as 
possible the rift th a t the theorizing m entality  deepens at o u r peril.4 We draw  
away, th ro u g h  language, th rough  cu ltu ra l trad ition , th ro u g h  o u r p reo ccu ­
pation with actual history, from  the sources o f instinctual anim al affirm ation. 
Art in its best m om ents reconciles the hubris of, say, linguistic com m unication
— a late evolutionary developm ent in any case -  with the d e e p e r  adequacy  
o f instinctual life, the original societal sources tha t Nietzsche claims can never 
be recovered  at ou r pecu lia r stage o f  d ev e lo p m en t. Seen  thus, »aesth e­
ticizing« signifies o u r bringing  o u r lives to a rt (as best we can) in  the sp irit 
in which a rt brings life to its instinctual affirm ation.
But, if so, then  N eham as is very subtly o ff the m ark  w hen, com paring  
Nietzsche with Proust (with whatever caveats), he  claims that »Nietzsche cam e 
to see perfec t self-sufficiency [som eth ing  like the P roustian  recovery an d  
coheren t integration of every detail in the u n en d in g  recovery o f a single life] 
as a p ro p e r test for the perfect life [an individual life as a w ork o f art] a t 
least partly because his thinking so o ften  co n cern ed  literary  m odels.«5 This 
is actually N eham as’s gloss on N ietzsche’s reco m m en d atio n  th a t »we should  
learn  from  artists while being wiser th an  they a re  in o th e r m atters. For with 
them  the subtle power [as in Proust, according to N eham as’s reading] usually 
comes to an  end  where art ends and  life begins: b u t we w ant to be the  poets 
o f o u r life -  first o f  all in the smallest, m ost everyday matters.«®
N eham as links the endlessness o f the  literary recovery o f the  details o f 
a life (th e  P roustian them e) with the d o c trin e  o f the  e te rn a l re tu rn . But 
N ietzsche m eans, as the con tex t o f the passage cited  m akes clear, to u rge 
tha t we work to recover the »beauty« o f  life in the  face o f the d istancing  
danger th a t things are n o t beautiful a t all ( th a t is, life-enhancing) e ith e r in 
themselves o r through the specialized perspectives o f o u r languaged  skills.
3 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985); particularly, Introduction.
4 I find this explained in one of the most remarkably up-to-date passages of Nietzsche’s, in 
The Gay Science, Bk. V, §354.
5 Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature, pp. 194-195; see, also, p. 164.
0 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bk. IV, §299 (pp. 239-240).
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F o r p recisely  this re aso n , R ichard  Rorty, relying p e rh ap s  too  m uch  on  
N eham as, offers the following diagnosis of Nietzsche -  hence of aestheticizing 
life: »For P roust an d  Nietzsche... there is nothing m ore powerful o r im portant 
th an  self-redescrip tion. T hey are n o t trying to su rm o u n t time and  chance, 
b u t to use them .... T h e  g reatest task o f the ironist [Nietzsche in particular, 
th o u g h  N ietzsche is n o t qu ite  the liberal that ironists like Rorty tend  to be] 
is [R orty in form s us] the  one  C oleridge reco m m en d ed  to the g reat and  
orig inal poet: to create  the taste by which he will be ju d g ed . But the ju d g e  
the iron ist has in m ind  is himself. He wants to be able to sum up  his life in 
his own term s.«7 T h e  im portance o f these m istaken readings (of Nietzsche) 
is th a t they he lp  to explain  the growing tendency in o u r own time — possibly 
p a r t o f a n a tu ra l dec lension  from  N ietzsche’s very d ifferen t conviction -  to 
view »aestheticizing« as en tren ch in g  the propriety  o f individual autonom y, 
e i th e r  the  d em o cra tized  o r the w ould-be m eritocra tic  au tho rity  for the 
m ean ing  and  validity o f o n e ’s own life, the enlargem ent o f the official privacy 
o f  each life (ironic and  liberal in that sense at least), and  the self-indulgence 
with which we deem  ourselves en titled  to p ronounce  o u r own lives »works 
o f art.« I have no doub t that that too is part of the m eaning of the aestheticizing 
o f  o rd inary  life. But surely it is a corrup tion  o f N ietzsche’s original them e.
It is true enough  tha t Nietzsche holds that no  life is justified that cannot 
m ee t the  test o f  the »eternal re turn .«  But the p o in t o f th a t »test« — which is, 
o f course, no  test a t all -  is th a t success is entirely instinctual, n o t hum an at 
all, an d  th a t m orality an d  trad ition  succeed only w here they engage such 
in co m p reh en sib le  energies. T h e re ’s absolutely no room  for optim ism  or 
reassurance th e re .8 Certainly no th in g  to cheer us on regard ing  »Nietzsche’s 
[supposed] effo rt to create  an artw ork ou t of himself,«9 possibly som ething 
m ore convincing th an  W alter P a ter’s donnish  pagan intensity or the effete 
energ ies o f the Yellow Book o r even the m ore charm ing  dandyism  o f Wilde 
a n d  B a u d e la ire ; c e r ta in ly  n o th in g  th a t w ould  lead  us to th e  k indly , 
dem ocratic, consum erist aestheticism  o f Jo h n  Dewey, in Art and Experience,10
7 R ichard Rorty, »Self-creating and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 97- 
99.
8 Com pare Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature, pp. 6-7.
0 Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature, p. 8.
10 See Jo h n  Dewey, Art as Experience (Philadelphia: Minton, Balch, 1934); also, Richard 
S husterm an, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York: 
R ou tledge , 1997). S h u ste rm an  attem pts to redeem  the Deweyan concep tion : 
»Pragmatism, as I conceive it after Dewey, [he says,] offers a distinctive way of defending 
the aesthetic m odel o f philosophical life against these troubling questions [that is, 
questions that burden  us with the defense of morality as opposed to ‘lifestyles’] by
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which, I may add, is n o t terribly distant from  Rorty’s trea tm en t o f N ietzsche’s 
aestheticism , u n d er the  shadow o f his own trea tm e n t o f  Dewey’s liberalism . 
T he essential difference betw een N ietzsche an d  his successors -  w h e th e r 
H eidegger o r  Rorty o r N eham as -  is simply that, fo r the latter, aestheticizing 
is invariably optim istic, forw ard-looking, an d  self-justifying, w hereas, fo r 
Nietzsche, such considerations are en tire ly  irrelevant. T h e  c u r re n t d eb a te  
is entirely skewed in the direction o f the fo rm er, w he ther insp ired  by Dewey 
or A dorno o r W ittgenstein or, indeed , Rorty.
A re all these d iffe ren t cu rren ts  really  th e  sam e? N o, it seem s n o t. 
Aestheticism, or the aestheticization o f life, if we may speak o f Nietzsche thus, 
so m eh o w  p re p a re d  th e  way fo r  a very  s tra n g e  se r ie s  o f  in c re d ib le  
displacem ents, mainly in Germany, th a t red irec ted  N ietzsche’s them es in to  
the brilliandy intuited nonsense fashioned by E rn s tjü n g er, A dolf H itler, and  
M artin H eidegger, and that signified th e re  a p ro fo u n d  cry (regardless o f its 
m onstrous possibilities and  irrelevancies) against the  perceived  vulgarity, 
glibness, vacuity, spreading power, acquisitiveness, anarchism , lack o f nobility 
and  heroism  of the bourgeois m arket world tha t -  to be sure -  has now  pretty  
well won hands down.
A estheticism  in tha t sense, as m uch  in  N ietzsche as in  W ilde -  an d , 
crazily, in Jü n g e r -  is a p ro test against the  self-congratulatory m oralities o f  
the West. It is also, therefore, a self-congratulatory m orality  o f its own, w hat 
we now call aestheticizing. But it is only in  N ietzsche th a t the  m etaphysical 
appeal to the instinct for life (curiously cobb led  by B ernard  Shaw) confirm s 
the futility o f any would-be rationally g ro u n d ed  m orality  a n d  politics o f  any 
stripe, a fortiori any aesthetic ized  »lifestyles« o ffe red  in  p lace  o f  know n 
m oralities -  or, as the apotheosis o f such m oralities, in  the  fam iliar m a n n e r 
m odeled by Pater or Jü n g er or endorsed  by Dewey o r p roposed  by N eham as 
( in te rp re tin g  N ietzsche) o r, m o re  p leasan tly , by R ich a rd  S h u s te rm a n  
(in te rp re tin g  Dewey) or W olfgang W elsch, o r  self-deceptively p roc la im ed  
by H eidegger (in his m ost H ölderlinesque m o m en ts ).11
These are very differen t ways o f coop ting  N ietzsche: som e congen ia l 
to our sensibilities, som e utterly im possible to defend . B ut the  im p o rtan t 
po in t rem ains: (i) that N ietzsche’s use o f the  n o tio n  (aestheticism , life as a 
work o f art) presupposes the futility o f ever com pletely  leg itim ating  o u r
underm ining the traditional, stifling oppositions on which they are based«; hence, their 
exposé is supposed to lead to Shusterm an’s endorsem ent o f »the aestheticization of 
ethics« pp. 5-6. See, also, Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking 
Art (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
11 See Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, 
andArt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), Division One.
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m oral an d  political norm s, fo r instance against bo th  K ant and Hegel; and 
(ii) th a t nearly  all post-N ietzschean uses o f N ietzsche’s alleged aestheticism  
resto re  the eligibility o f w hat N ietzsche expressly denies. T he question o f 
w hat we should  now m ean by the aestheticization o f life hangs in the balance.
W hen, for instance, Nietzsche declares, in The Birth of Tragedy- a  them e 
h e  never re lin q u ish ed  b u t only transform ed: »the en tire  com edy o f a rt is 
n e ith e r p e rfo rm ed  fo r o u r b e tte rm en t o r education, n o r are we the true 
au thors o f this a rtw orld . O n  the contrary, we may assume that we are merely 
im ages an d  artistic p ro jec tions of the true  au th o r [th e  W ill], and  th a t we 
have o u r h ig h est dignity  in  o u r significance as works o f a rt -  for it is only as 
an  aesthetic phenomenon th a t existence and  the world are eternally justified — 
while o f course o u r consciousness o f our own significance hardly differs from  
th a t w hich soldiers p a in ted  on  canvas have o f the battle rep resen ted .«12
As I read  this, N ietzsche is affirm ing (in his arch way) th a t o u r lives, 
m anifesting  the  »lifestyles« th a t collect a viable society, are for tha t reason 
an  »aesthetic p h en o m en o n «  justified  »eternally« b u t not in any h u m an  way. 
N ietzsche’s aestheticism , even the literary shaping of his own life, is no  m ore 
th a n  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  irre levance , as far as th e  Will to  Pow er is 
c o n c e rn e d , o f  th e  w ould-be ra tiona l defense o f any personal o r  societal 
lifesty le, in c lu d in g  any  d ev o ted  to m ak in g  th a t  sam e lesson c lea r an d  
convincing th ro u g h  the  irony o f its own success. T h at is w hat is m issing in 
N eham as an d  Rorty -  a n d  w hat is freed  from  its m oorings, naively b u t 
generously  in Dewey, and  also very cleverly b u t falsely in H eidegger.
T h ere  is no  sense in w hich Nietzsche can be m ade to provide a criterial 
g ro u n d  for choosing  any one m orality or politics over any o th er or, indeed , 
a g ro u n d  for any deliberate  aestheticism  or aestheticization o f ordinary  life. 
I d o n ’t m ean by tha t that it is impossible to reconcile Nietzsche’s final reading 
o f the Will to  Pow er with the  quotid ian  problem s of justifying aw ay of life, 
b u t they are n o t linearly  connected  in any way.
M ore th an  th a t, w hen  you sep ara te  aesthetic ism  from  N ie tzsch e’s 
p ro fo u n d  m yth, you are left with no th ing  m ore than  Dewey’s consum erism , 
J ü n g e r’s m adness, W ilde’s dandyism , H eidegger’s grandiosity, Rorty’s wilful 
anarchy, and  similar exotica. S tripped o f that connection, the aestheticization 
o f life is any th ing  we please, som ehow  relieved -  by a supposed authenticity  
m ere  m oralities c a n n o t claim  -  o f any need  for explicit validation.
O nce you have this p ic tu re  before you, you realize that, for us, fo r m ere 
m ortal hum ans a ttem p tin g  to justify one ideology or trad ition  o r m orality
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §5, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter 
Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1977, cited by Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature.
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or lifestyle over an o th er, it d o esn ’t m a tte r, initially, w h e th e r we believe 
»aestheticizing« m orality is or is n o t an  im p ro v em en t over resisting  any 
in tended  practical change. T he contest takes the  fam iliar form  it always has; 
o r (better) г/w e  could improve the rigor o f  m oral a rgum en t, we shou ld  have 
to do so across the board  -  tha t is, to include aesthetic ized  ju d g m en ts  as 
well. T h e re ’s no way to coop t N ietzsche’s use o f the  expression  »aesthetic 
p h enom enon«  (or its in ten d ed  doctrine) to gain a dialectical advantage in 
choosing, for instance, betw een Dewey an d  Jü n g e r  -  if you can im agine th a t 
ever m aking sense!
T he idea  is preposterous. N ot only w ould such a choice invoke two 
radically d ifferen t notions o f  aestheticizing life -  fo r w hich, th en , we w ould 
need  a meta-aestheticizing rule and, for that, a m eta-m eta-rule -  b u t the tru th  
is: it m akes no  m ore  sense to speak o f  co rrec tly  ch o o sin g  aesth e tic ized  
lifestyles th an  of m aking pedestrian  m oral choices. We ca n n o t even fa thom  
any principles or o rd e red  distinctions betw een the m oral an d  the  aesthetic
-  a fortiori, betw een their respective g rounds o r c rite ria .13
My own view is that the whole business is a terrib le m uddle. I have never 
seen a convincing account o f  the d isjunction  betw een m oral an d  aesthetic  
values or, I may as well say, any convincing accoun t o f  the d istinct extensions 
o f »moral« and  »aesthetic« values that would bear in anyway on  the precision 
o r objectivity o f p e r tin e n t ju d g m en ts . I take th e  K an tian  m o d el to  b e  a 
com plete disaster, to have alm ost n o  b ea rin g  on  e ith e r m oral m atters o r 
m atters regarding the quality o f art o r  the sense in which aesthetic and  artistic 
values d iffe r or may be reco n c iled  o r  g rad ed . I have n o  c o n f id e n c e  in 
un iversal n o rm s o f any o f these so rts, ex cep t, trivially, in  th e  sen se  o f 
consistency o f  usage. I d o n ’t believe there  are any obvious criteria for m aking 
a life a »work of art« in the norm ative sense N eham as draws from  N ietzsche, 
or in the rom antic sense o f ennob ling  ex p erien ce  th a t Schiller draws from  
Kant,14 or even in the naive sense -  hardly the equivalent o f R oland B arthes’s 
little jo k e  -  the »consum m atory experience ,«  the  lesser jouissance Dewey 
prom ises all of us.15
I d o n ’t see anything ennob ling  ab o u t a rt tout court, unless co n tac t with 
an y th in g  h u m an  is en n o b lin g . I d o n ’t see th a t a r t  o r  m o ra lity  is ever 
universally com pelling (where the claim  is n o t vacuous) o r  ever sufficiently 
uniform  to encourage us to search for underly ing universal values — perhaps,
13 SeeJ. O. Urmson, »What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?« Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Suppl. Vol. XXXI (1957).
14 See Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. 
Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).
15 See Dewey, Art as Experience, Ch. 8.
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th en , fo r specifically dem ocratic  o r anti-dem ocratic values. I take all o f tha t 
to  b e  a fake. I f  we really  lacked  g rounds for an  objective m oral d eb a te  
betw een  co m p e tin g  visions, we co u ld n ’t possibly ex p ect to gain a b e tte r  
a rg u m en t by drifting  to aesthetic o r artistic grounds: I d o n ’t even know what 
th a t w ould m ean. T h ere  is n o  legible direction in art o r aesthetic values.
I d o n ’t be lieve  th a t N ie tz sch e ’s sp len d id  criticism s o f trad itio n a l 
m oralities ever req u ired  his own grand  doctrine of the Will to Power, or 
a re  for th a t reason  particu larly  weak in any dialectically im p o rtan t sense. 
T he only reason aestheticism  o r aestheticization cuts no m oral ice and affords 
n o  distinctive lifestyle is sim ply tha t w here it is relevant it has always been  
re levan t -  even if, u n d e r  o th e r  labels and  for every conceivable cause. If 
you m ean , by » aesthe tic iz ing ,«  using  o r d irec tin g  a r t  in  the  service o f 
dem ocratiz ing  o u r society m ore  than it has been, or s tren g th en in g  a fascist 
society, th en  your m oral and  political objectives will surely take p recedence 
over the  aesthetic  and  artistic; and, in any case, changes in the one will go 
h a n d  in  h a n d  with the o th er. T here  is no  convincing privileging in e ither 
d irec tio n , an d  th e re  are no  particu lar values that are assured, o r known to 
be  w orth  saving, by tu rn in g  from  the putatively m oral o r political to the 
artistic o r the  aesthetic  -  th a t is, in  any sense beyond the sense in which we 
have n o  wish to im poverish the cu lture to which we belong.
I I
I have a very d iffe ren t read ing  o f N ietzsche’s aestheticism  to offer. I 
m ean  a read in g  th a t is n o t m erely bookish, a reading th a t bears ra th e r on 
the real-world circum stances o f m oral and  political life and  does n o t p re tend  
to snatch  a co n cep tu a l privilege from  any source. For, for one thing, the 
so lu tion  to the p rob lem  o f the  m eaning o f life is, actually, logically trivial 
(bu t n o t u n im p o rtan t for tha t reason, and no t assuredly sufficient for anyone 
who finds the q uestion  unnerv ing) ; and, fo r ano ther, Nietzsche was plainly 
aware o f  th a t sense o f  the m atter, since it’s already em bedded  in his own 
acco u n t o f G reek tragedy.
T h e  d o c tr in e  ru n s  as follows: life has n o  m ean in g  a p a rt from  the  
e n tre n ch ed  trad itions o f  o n e ’s own culture, w here the question  arises and  
is m et at the level o f  instinct th a t Nietzsche him self invokes -  b u t not, there, 
in recognizably h u m an  term s. T h a t’s all! It is the same doctrine  tha t takes 
the form  o f the challenge of the »eternal return,« relative to which any cultural 
p ra c tic e  th a t survives over tim e an d  ch an g e  co u n ts  as th e  successfu l 
aesthetic ization  o f o rd inary  life.
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T here  are no differential h u m an  values at this level o f  instinc tua l life; 
h en ce , th e re  are n o  d iffe ren tia l values ap t fo r assessing th e  fu n c tio n a l 
adequacy o f  aestheticized or cultural life. »W hatever has value in  o u r  w orld 
[Nietzsche declares] now does n o t have value in itself, according to its na tu re
-  nature is always value-less, bu t has been  given value at som e time, as a p resen t
-  an d  it was « w h o  gave an d  bestow ed it.« 16 If  you take this literally, as 
N ietzsche apparently  in tends it to be, th en  the norm ative g rounds on w hich 
m oral, political, artistic, aesthetic, an d  sim ilar commitments and judgments are 
regularly assessed have no th ing  to do  in any p o in ted  way with the  fu n c tio n  
of aestheticization, except in the negative sense th a t no  such appraisals have 
any relevance for life if they are n o t pertin en tly  life-affirm ing. T h e  fam ous 
wisdom o f  Silenus, for instance, m akes sense as a coun term ove only against 
those who afjirm tha t life and n a tu re  have in trinsic value.
N ietzsche is in s tru c tin g  us h e re  a b o u t th e  in h e re n t  deficiency o f  all 
p ractical reason ing  and  ju d g m en t: it rests o n  »grounds« th a t c a n n o t be 
converted  in to  strict norm s and, relative to th a t functionality  in n a tu re , no  
m ere ly  h u m a n  n o rm s co u ld  ever co n v in c in g ly  d isq u a lify  c o m p e tin g  
»aestheticizations« (read: diverging cu ltu res o r d iverg ing  h isto ries) th a t 
similarly survive.
W h a t N ie tzsch e  o b scu res  by th is  d e l ib e ra te  e x tra v a g a n c e  is th e  
im p o rtan t p o in t th a t the validation o f  m oral a n d  po litical a n d  aesthe tic  
argum ents presupposes the life-enhancing viability such argum en ts c a n n o t 
possibly provide; hence, tha t argum ents abou t the righ t d irec tion  o f life are, 
necessarily, rhetorically defective bu t n o t hum anly  irrelevant for th a t reason. 
T hat is also the lesson of the exem plary G reek tragedies, for aestheticization 
co n cern s  th e  reasons fo r o u r loyalty to  p a r tic u la r  lifestyles, trad itio n s , 
paradigm atic lives that we find com pelling by o u r lights. T o say th a t N ietzsche 
m ad e a w ork  o f  a r t  o f  h is own life  is to  say l i t t le  m o re  th a n  th a t  h is 
philosophical objections to traditional m oralities and  ideologies can n o t now 
be denied . We adm it that we are taken with the  relevance o f  his argum en ts, 
as we m igh t be by the charm  of an  u n ex p ec ted  poem . N ietzsche is explicit 
enough  ab o u t all this: »Gradually, m an  has becom e a fantastic anim al,« he 
says, »that has to fulfill one m ore condition o f existence than any o th er animal: 
m an has to believe, to know, from  tim e to tim e why he  exists: his race can n o t 
flourish w ithout a periodic trust in  life -  w ithou t faith in reason in life.«''7
If I understand this correctly, then , since any deliberately pu rsued  m ode 
o f life, N ietzsche’s life, say, viewed as an  ex em p la r, o r  N ie tz sch e ’s own 
exem plar o f Attic life construed in term s o f G reek tragedy (th a t is, an  en tire
16 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bk. IV, §301 (p. 242).
17 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bk. I, §1 (p. 75).
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society’s trad itio n ), counts as the aestheticization o f life, there is no po in t to 
m oral o r political d ispute th a t fails to come to term s with the protean nature 
o f  su ch  »aesthetic«  values; an d  no  c la im an t can h o p e  to v indicate the 
exclusive righ t o f  any single exem plar or state the conditions u n d er which it 
has any d ifferential rig h t at all. In N ietzsche’s terms, the in h eren t deficiency 
o f practical leg itim ation  answers to, and is m ade good in, the Will to Power. 
N ietzsche casts the idea  o f an  approved life in  term s o f an  ulteriorly inspired 
fo rm  o f  se lf-d ecep tio n ; in  th e  h u m an  w orld , we d e b a te  th e  m erits  o f  
alternative lives at a certain  displaced level a t which we dem and  a convincing 
ra tio n a le , en tan g lin g  ourselves thereby  in the  im agined  sufficiency and 
objectivity (hence, also, the exclusionary power) o f o u r fine argum ents.
I d o n ’t f in d  th is p articu la rly  alien  to  th e  co n d itio n s  u n d e r  w hich 
W ittgenstein , in Philosophical Investigations, speaks of the h um an  Lebensform. 
ex cep t th a t N ietzsche favors th e  lesson of the th rea t of m eaninglessness and  
W ittg en s te in , th e  s lim m er thesis th a t all a rg u m e n t m ust u ltim ate ly  be 
g ro u n d ed , n o t in  p ropositions, b u t in our form  o f life.18 T he two doctrines 
go h a n d  in h an d . T h a t is, the  idea that theory is itself a form  o f practice 
signifies th a t h u m an  reason ing  is largely ad hoc, occasional, contextually 
disciplined, logically inform al, and  incom pletable in principle -  in ways that 
go con trary  to all the s tan d ard  presum ptions o f systematic theory (closure, 
foundations, explanatory inclusiveness, and bivalence). T hat is certainly close 
to the  h e a rt o f  w hat N ietzsche m eans by aestheticism: som eth ing  very far 
rem oved from  all those o th er specim en views ranging, in however heterodox 
a  way, from  S ch ille r’s to A d o rn o ’s to Rorty’s.
W hat needs to be especially rem arked is the entirely subordinate nature 
o f d istinctions draw n betw een the m oral, the political, the artistic, and  the 
aesthetic . T he p rincipa l clue to all the variant taxa is tha t the judgm ents in 
question  are all practical, all g ro u n d ed  in a viable tradition  -  a sense th a t is 
com m on , I suggest, to N ietzsche and W ittgenstein in an unexpected  way. I 
d o n ’t m ean to concede by that tha t there are theoreticaljudgm ents that have 
an  en tire ly  d iffe ren t cognitive source from  practical ju d g m en ts . O n  the  
contrary , the in te restin g  possibility is that all ju d g m en ts are practical (or 
g ro u n d e d  in the practical) in the same way. T hat is certainly a radical idea, 
b u t it is also thorough ly  N ietzschean. For the m om ent, le t m e say that this 
sm all ad ju s tm en t yields two benefits: for one, it opposes prioritizing the 
m o ra l over th e  ae s th e tic  o r  artistic , o r  vice versa, an d  it disallows any 
privileging o f the validity o f practical judgm ents in anyway; and, for a second, 
by ad m ittin g  the  in h e re n t deficiency of every »rational« effort to legitim ate
18 See Ludwig W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1953), for instance I, §§241-242, 479-481.
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m oralities o r lifestyles, it concedes the  inescapable ro le  o f  the  en tire  span  
o f historically  d ivergent traditions, w hich, accordingly , c a n n o t fail to  be  
»equal« in  th e  eyes o f the Will to Power.
T he literal m eaning  o f this last concession -  to  convert its lesson in to  
term s th a t m igh t reasonably b elong  to W ittg en ste in ’s slim m er thesis -  is 
simply th a t there are indefinitely m any societal lifestyles to  h o n o r: n o  one  
choice cou ld  ever convincingly p rec lu d e  th e  eligibility o f  th e  o th ers , on  
g rounds o f divergence alone; and  since n o  single lifestyle can ex p ec t to  be  
exclusionary, practical argum ents ca n n o t ad h e re  to an  u n co m p ro m is in g  
bivalence o r any princip led  privilege. Aestheticism  signifies, in  N ietzsche, a 
pagan respect for every powerful m anifesta tion  o f h u m an  life. Som e may 
see in it an  im plicit dem ocracy, b u t th a t w ould betray  the  d e e p e r  doctrine : 
som eth ing  akin to substituting Parsifal fo r O edipus.
I l l
All the foregoing is true enough. But the persistence o f the aestheticing 
move in  o u r own late age has p retty  well a b a n d o n ed  N ietzsche’s s te rn e r  
doctrine. I t is now, I think, a kind o f  o p p o rtu n ism , concep tually  re leased  
from  all pretensions o f m odernist legitim ation. Even in H eidegger, suprem e 
philosophical opportun ist tha t he  was, the  question  o f leg itim ation  seem s 
to have persisted. You find it, fo r instance, after the Kehre, w hen H eidegger 
is b en t on  recovering the them es o f his early lectu res on  H ö ld erlin  (1934- 
35), as in »The Q uestion concerning Technology« (1953) and  related  papers, 
w here H e id e g g e r offers an  in g en io u s  su b v ersio n  o f  N ie tz sc h e ’s m o re  
in n o cen t doctrine, w here he  aestheticizes the  final destinai calling  o f the 
G erm an Volk\19 Extraordinary!
I d o n ’t d o u b t tha t H eidegger’s final on tology -  the o n e  in w hich, per 
H ölderlin , the poet, like the Führer and , like H eidegger him self, is said to 
be gifted enough  to receive the saving self-disclosure o f B eing th a t m ay yet 
reverse the en tire  Nazi b lu n d er -  is, by far, the  m ost ex trem e form  o f  the 
aestheticization o f life that our end-of-century can boast. N evertheless, its 
political opportun ism  is still soberly cast in term s o f a k ind  o f  realism  that, 
however mysterious and  outrageous, is ab a n d o n ed  in tu rn  by the  post-war 
aestheticism s of the victorious West.
You see this in its m ost fantastic form  in Rorty, if the ju x tap o sitio n  will
19 Martin Heidegger, »The Question concerning Technology« (trans. William Lovitt), in 
Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: H arper & Row, 1977). See, also, 
Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, Chs. 7-8.
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n o t o ffen d  you. I can only p lead that Rorty directly addresses the question 
in assessing H eidegger himself. Effectively, he dismisses H eidegger’s doctrine 
by a so rt o f  psychoanalysis, m akes the en tire  tale o f H eidegger’s last version 
o f aesthetic ization  no  m o re  th an  a self-deceptive mask for his true ironism
-  acco rd in g  to the fo rm ula o f ironism  already cited. W hich is to say, Rorty 
replaces H eidegger’s aestheticization by his own m ore candidly opportunistic 
version: h e  re tu rn s  us in  a b o ld er way to the assertive, self-justifying, private 
o r au to n o m o u s, even liberal, act o f any o f us by which we simply declare 
o u r lives to be  a w ork o f art. T h a t is surely the last irony of all the turns of 
aestheticism .
»’D a se in ’,« R orty avers, »was, so to  say, H e id e g g e r’s nam e fo r th e  
ironist,« th a t is, him self. »But, in his later period , [he warns,] this word is 
rep laced  by ‘E u ro p e ’ o r ‘the W est’ -  the personification o f the place w here 
B eing  p layed  o u t a destiny  w hich en d e d  in iron ism .«20 Rorty th inks o f 
H e id eg g er as »the g reatest theoretical im agination o f his time (outside the 
n a tu ra l sciences).« B ut h e  failed »where P roust succeeded«; for, following 
P roust, Rorty finds th a t »novels are a safer m edium  than  [philosophical] 
theory« fo r the aesthetic ization  o f private life.21
T h a t  is, R o rty  r e tu r n s  us to  so m e th in g  like N e h a m a s ’s eq u a lly  
co m m o d ified  re a d in g  o f  N ietzsche. H e idegger som ehow  believed that, 
b eg in n in g  with the p ro jec t o f B eing  a n d  Time, he could rem ake him self as 
the sage o f the W est, by isolating the essential words — yes, the words -  by 
w hich  (by ana logy  w ith  H ö ld e rlin  and  even N ietzsche, b u t surpassing  
N ietzsche), we m ig h t vouchsafe the righ t receptive re la tionship  to Being. 
T h ere  you have Rorty’s gloss on  tha t fateful line from  Being a n d  Time. »The 
u ltim ate  business o f ph ilosophy is to preserve the force o f  the most elementary 
words in w hich D asein expresses itself, an d  to keep the com m on u n d e r­
s tand ing  from  leveling them  off to that unintelligibility which functions... as 
a source o f pseudo-problem s.«22
»H eidegger,« Rorty claims, »had set him self the [impossible] problem  
o f how  to surpass, place, and  set aside all past [philosophical] theory w ithout 
o n ese lf theorizing.« H e th o u g h t he  could replace explicit theory by poetic 
»’hints and  gestures’« (H eidegger’s own characterization) »distinct from the 
‘signs an d  ch iffres’ o f m etaphysics.«2’ But he failed, because he failed to see
20 Rorty, »Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« p. 113.
21 Rorty, »Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« pp. 107, 118.
22 Rorty, »Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« p. 112. The 
line is from  M artin H eidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (NewYork: H arper & Row, 1962), §44 (p. 262).
23 Rorty, »Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« pp. 112, 115.
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that the righ t form  o f aestheticization req u ired  ab andon ing  even tha t h ig h er 
metaphysics, opting m ore frankly for lite ra tu re  and  »conversation.« In  short, 
Rorty suggests, H eidegger was really an  »ironist« in R orty’s own sense b u t 
simply failed to recognize the fact.
This is a rem arkable claim on  R orty’s part, given the im p o rtan ce  o f 
the line from  Being and Time. H eidegger h a d  explicitly w arned  -  in the  very 
same passage -  that »we m ust avoid u n in h ib ited  word-mysticism«; an d , in 
offering this »definition« o f »truth« an d  the  associated acco u n t o f  »Being« 
and  »the logos,« he adds that »we have n o t shaken oJJthe  trad itio n , b u t  we 
have ap p ro p ria ted  it primordially.«241 shou ld  say th a t this was n o t (yet) an  
aestheticization, in H eidegger’s m ind, b u t it surely counts as an  an ticipation  
o f his eventual rep lacem en t o f N ietzsche’s version. But le t th a t pass. I t  is 
closer to the tru th  to say tha t Rorty construes H eid eg g er an d  Dewey an d  
W ittgenstein, his self-designated m entors, in ways congenial to his own variant 
of aestheticism, that is, closer to a liberal irony. O n tha t reading , aestheticism  
is the Geist o f  history tha t brings N ietzsche h o m e to bourgeo is m arkets.
I can n o t forebear, therefore, citing the  following passage from  R orty’s 
essay, »Private Irony and  Liberal H ope,« because it may be the m ost succinct 
statem entw e are likely to find o f Rorty’s conception ofw hat it is to aestheticize 
o n e ’s life, hence also a statem ent o f  his m ost focused read in g  o f  m oral an d  
political issues in  the aestheticist m anner; an d  because I very m uch  d o u b t 
th a t you w ould believe a m ere  p a rap h ra se  th a t suggested  th a t R orty  was 
playing o u t a liberal read ing  o f N ietzsche’s an d  H e id eg g er’s very d iffe ren t 
aestheticisms. Well, see w hat you m ake o f this:
W e iro n is ts  tr e a t  th ese  p eo p le  [H eg e l, H e in e , K ie rk e g aa rd , B lake, 
F re u d , D. H . L aw rence, G eo rg e  O rw ell, N ie tz sc h e , P ro u s t, L io n e l 
T rilling] n o t as anonym ous channels fo r tru th  b u t as abbrev iations fo r 
a certa in  final vocabulary and  for th e  sorts o f  beliefs an d  desires typical 
o f its users . . . .  We trea t the nam es o f  such peo p le  as th e  nam es o f  th e  
heroes o f th e ir  own books. We do  n o t b o th e r  to  d istinguish  Swift from  
indignatio, H egel from  Geist, N ietzsche from  Z arathustra , M arcel P roust 
from  M arcel th e  N arra to r, o r T rilling  fro m  T h e  L ibera l Im ag in atio n .
We do n o t care w hether these w riters m anaged  to  live u p  to th e ir  own 
self-images. W hat we w ant to know  is w h e th e r to  a d o p t those  im ages — 
to re-create ourselves, in  whole o r  in  part, in  these p e o p le ’s im age. W e 
go a b o u t answ ering this question  by e x p e r im e n tin g  w ith th e  v ocabu ­
laries w hich th e se  p eo p le  co n c o c te d . W e re d e sc r ib e  ou rse lves, o u r  
s i tu a tio n , o u r  p as t, in  th o se  te rm s  a n d  c o m p a re  th e  re s u lts  w ith  
a lte rna tive  red e sc rip tio n s  w hich are  th e  v o cab u la rie s  o f  a l te rn a tiv e  
figures. We ironists hope, by this co n tin u al red escrip tio n , to  m ake th e  
b est selves fo r ourselves th a t we can .25
24 Heidegger, Bang and Time, p. 262.
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T h ere  is a d an g er h ere  -  which I would no t willingly accuse Rorty o f 
neglecting. N evertheless, the plainly in ten d ed  congruity betw een his own 
words and  his ironist in terp re ta tion  o f H eidegger’s words about »elem entary 
w ords,«  c ited  ju s t  above, raises the  q u es tio n  how, if  »theory« is to be 
a lto g e th e r  ab a n d o n e d , sh o u ld  we ever be able to ju stify  the exposé o f 
H e idegger him self, o r Paul de Man for tha t m atter, who (in an o th er sense 
o f  »irony«) insisted  on  an  inseparable linkage betw een m etaphysics and  
poetry  (against the evidence o f his own life and  against the view o f H arold 
Bloom, w hom  Rorty follows h e re 26)?
W h a t is it  th a t  k ee p s  R o rty ’s a e s th e tic ism  fro m  y ie ld in g  to  self- 
congratu lato ry  fictions th a t can now play themselves o u t - i n  a fantasy world 
o f affluence at least -  that has no real bearing on the constraints of the public 
world? N o th in g  th a t I can see.
Keep R orty’s words in view therefore:
W e revise o u r  own m ora l iden tity  [he says] by revising o u r own final 
v o cab u la ry . L ite ra ry  c ritic ism  does fo r  iro n is ts  w hat th e  search  fo r 
un iversa l m ora l p rin c ip les  is supposed  to  do  fo r  m etaphysicians.
F or us iron ists , n o th in g  can  serve as a criticism  of a final vocabulary 
[ re m e m b e r  H e id e g g e r!]  save a n o th e r  such vocabulary; th e re  is no  
an sw er to  a  re d e sc r ip tio n  save a re -re -red e sc rip tio n . S ince th e re  is 
n o th in g  b e y o n d  v o ca b u la rie s  w hich serves as a  c r ite r io n  o f  ch o ice  
betw een  th em , criticism  is a m atte r o f  looking  on this p ic tu re an d  on 
th a t, n o t o f  co m p arin g  b o th  p ictures with the orig inal.27
T h e  p ro p er, perfectly  sim ple answer to all this is, o f course: a lthough 
th e re  are n o  final vocabularies, every vocabulary harb o rs a discipline of 
re sponsib ility . »Final« m u st m ean  -  fo r Rorty -  »arbitrary,« free  o f  all 
responsibility, aestheticized. But if tha t is the tail-end o f aestheticism , as I’m 
afraid it is, th en  le t’s have an  end  o f it. Rorty could n o t be m ore explicit: 
»irony is o f  little public use . . . .  Ironists should  reconcile themselves to a 
private-public split w ithin their final vocabularies, to the fact that resolution 
o f doub ts ab o u t o n e ’s final vocabulary has no th ing  in  particu lar to do  with 
a ttem pts to save o th er people from  pain and hum iliation.«28 Rorty has m ade 
com m odities o u t o f N ietzsche and  H eidegger; he is also o f course entirely 
com fortab le  with haw king his own private ironism . But we ourselves are 
cau g h t betw een the  h o n es t recognition o f endlessly varied forms o f viable
25 See Richard Rorty, »Private Irony and Liberal Hope,« Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
pp. 79-80.
26 See Richard Rorty, »The Contingency of Selfhood,« Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 
25nn2-3.
27 Rorty, »Private Irony and Liberal Hope,« p. 80.
28 Rorty, »Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,« p. 120.
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life and the impossibility o f accepting every alternative to o u r own. H ow  can 
aestheticizing alter that?
Hardly anyone whom Rorty adm ires o r takes to be his m en to r -  certainly 
n o t H eidegger o r Dewey or W ittgenstein -  had  the least tem ptation  to accep t 
any th ing  like a »private-public split.« P erh ap s o n e  finds it in  P ro u s t o r  
Nabokov, b u t alm ost now here else: certain ly  not in D errid a  o r F o u cau lt o r 
de M an o r Bloom for instance. T he private, in  any p e r tin e n t »ethical« sense, 
is a »space« set aside Jor public reasons, not a disjoint sector o j life in  which a 
»fin a l« vocabulary separated from whatever holds in the public sector rightly (perhaps 
arbitrarily) obtains. W hatever else is true, the d isjunction  dem ands a defense, 
bu t the idea is finally incoherent. For if a r t  is, as it is, p a rt o f  a public cu ltu re , 
then Rorty’s »private« self-discipline is little m ore than a pose that has no th ing  
to do with defensible distinctions o f any sort.
No. T h e  final tru th  ab o u t aesth e tic ism , o r th e  a e s th e tic iz a tio n  o f  
everyday life, is simply that, if it has a m essage, it is a m essage o f  cu ltu ra l 
generosity  o r a dem ocracy o f ideas (if saying th a t will n o t m islead  you), 
perhaps a rem in d er o f neg lected  o r m arginalized  resources. I am  n o t as 
sanguine for instance as R ichard S husterm an  ab o u t the  possibilities o f  an  
aestheticism  o f rap, b u t I see no reason to exclude it.2u I also g ran t the  poin t, 
therefore, o f W olfgang W elsch’s tem p ered  p lea for ex ten d in g  o u r aesthetic  
concerns beyond art and traditional aesthetics to encom pass the  w hole span 
o f experience. But if you follow its logic, you see th a t it views the  »aesthetic« 
as a way o f defin ing  the en tire  possible Field o f  inqu iry  ra th e r  th an  as a 
criterion for assessing any elem ents th a t may be fo u n d  in it.30 W elsch follows 
A dorno m ore than Schiller here, th a t is, in  en d o rsin g  o u r tran scen d in g  the 
aesthetic by finding the aesthetic in the whole o f global experience an d  reality 
ra th e r than  in train ing  up o u r sensibility an d  reason  to a new u n h ea rd -o f 
heigh t.31 T h e  them e strikes me as conceptually  th e rap eu tic  ra th e r th an  as 
politically corrective -  perhaps also, th en , a t least d istantly  N ietzschean. If  
so, then I find the same idea very widely favored and  p resen t in m any guises.32 
I have no quarre l with it.
Also, then , aesthetic »self-enrichm ent and  »perfection,«  w h e th e r in  
Rorty’s subversively dem ocratic sense o r in S h u ste rm an ’s m ore op tim istic
20 See Shusterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics, Ch. 8, and S husterm an’s generally congenial 
summary, in Ch. 9, of what he takes to be the lesson of aestheticization.
30 See Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, trans. Andrew Inkpin (London: Sage, 1997), 
Ch. 4.
31 Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, pp. 65-71.
32 For example, I find it in F. R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact 
and Value (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), particularly pp. 16-18. Ankersmit 
expressly prefers Machiavelli to Schiller here.
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sense, strikes m e as as difficult to refuse as apple pie (w hether eaten in secrecy 
o r at th e  d in n e r  ta b le ) . Both are versions o f a form  o f  consum erism  that 
e ith e r refuses to spell ou t, o r sees no need  to spell out, how  ethical m atters 
m igh t be  affected by adm itting  aestheticism ’s concerns. I am as willing as 
the nex t ph ilosopher to reject, for reasons, the standard forms of »modernist« 
philosoph ies, ex ten d in g  to ethics and  politics. But I can n o t see how, apart 
from  a p lea  fo r cu ltu ra l openness, the doctrine  o f the »aesthetic life« cuts 
any e th ica l ice at all: how  o r why, in particular, »aesthetic considerations 
a re  o r sh o u ld  be,« as S husterm an insists, »crucial an d  ultim ately perhaps 
p a ra m o u n t in  d e te rm in in g  how we choose to lead o r shape o u r lives and  
how  we assess w hat a good  life is.«
I ’m afraid I d o n ’t really see how that actually »fleshes o u t W ittgenstein’s 
am biguous b u t  well-know n d ictum  th a t e th ics and  aesthetics are one by 
e rec tin g  the aesthetic as the p ro p e r ethical ideal, the p re ferred  m odel and 
c rite rio n  o f assessm ent for the good life.«33 W ittgenstein, you rem em ber, 
explicitly m ean t his p roposition  to apply to the  world sub specie aetemitatis. 
T h a t is o f  course precisely nož what either Rorty o r Shusterm an have in mind. 
But, beyond  that, i f  on  the  supposed argum ent, the aesthetic should be the 
»m odel an d  criterion«  o f th e  good life, th en  we have a righ t to ask w hat the 
distinction h ad  form erly been  between the aesthetic and  the ethical and  how 
it w ould now  be im proved; an d  that would surely b ring  us back to the age- 
old  questions th a t were to have been  superseded. Lacking such a rationale, 
I can n o t see how to escape the ju d g m en t that, now, at the end  o f the century, 
th e  ae s th e tic iza tio n  o f  everyday life can be any th ing  b u t ph ilo soph ical 
o p p o rtu n ism  o r anarch ical o r dem ocratic consum erism . But, if so, I m ust 
ad m it th a t n e ith e r o f  these two pies suits m e as well as apple pie.
IV
T h e re ’s m uch  m ore to the m atter than  can be d iscerned  by laying ou t 
all th e  o dd  twists and  tu rns o f seem ing theory along the lines collected. I 
have n o  d o u b t  th a t  a g o o d  d ea l o f  the  aesth e tic iz in g  issue is en tire ly  
straightforw ard. B ut it is also an  eccentric form  o f political sta tem ent and, 
in  som e instances, fo r instance those involving H eidegger and  Rorty, it is 
very difficult n o t to suppose that the aestheticizing formula may be interpreted
33 Shusterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics, p. 237. The reference to Wittgenstein is to proposition 
6.421 of the Tractatus, which makes an appearance in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 
1914-1916, ed. B. H. von W right and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), p. 83e (7.10.16).
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as a kind o f Aesopian p ronouncem en t. Q uite  frankly, in  o u r own tim e, the 
aesth e tic iz in g  issue is n o t un like th e  d isp u te  b e tw een  m o d e rn ism  an d  
postm odernism , that is, m ore a sym ptom  o f  a deflected  worry o r co n cern  
than  a legible dispute tha t is explicitly w hat it appears to be on  its face.
T he aestheticizing issue seems to have congealed  in two p rincipal ways: 
one, by opportunistically  reversing N ie tzsch e’s thesis a b o u t th e  m ean in ­
glessness o f the m eaning  o f life; the o th er, by opportunistically  d isto rting  
Kant’s intuition (in the T hird Critique), that is, that the aesthetic may prom ote 
an d  e n r ic h  the  rea liza tio n  o f  o u r  m o ra l c o n c e rn s , now , h o w ev er, by 
disorganizing the h ith e rto  valid d istinction  betw een the two. If  you listen 
closely to all the principal voices already collected , you c a n n o t fail to find 
that, despite enorm ous differences,Jü n g er, H eidegger, N eham as, an d  Rorty 
propose qu ite  arbitrary, idiosyncratic, surprisingly u p b ea t visions o f life as 
art, w hether proto-fascist o r extrem e laissez-faire liberal, th a t gymnastically 
convert N ietzsche’s u tte r con tem pt for self-congratulatory  m oralities in to  
newer form s o f self-congratulation. T he p ro n o u n cem en ts  o f  these w orthies 
are noticeably unconstrained by any would-be schem a o f objective assessment. 
T hat is the source of their charm : evidently we are blessed, as J ü n g e r  and  
H eidegger suppose, with high revelations th a t eclipse the m erely m u n d an e  
choices o f the  bourgeois world or, as N eham as an d  Rorty suppose, we are 
en titled  to affirm straightforw ardly the  au to n o m o u s near-anarchy  o f the 
private lives we choose to pursue. In  e ith e r case, th ere  are n o  in d e p e n d e n t 
leg itim ative  co n stra in ts  to invoke -  b ey o n d  o u r  <dicta: th a t  is, re a d in g  
Nietzsche as seer or postm odernist, athletically  o r indulgently . I t ’s in  this 
sense th a t I take »aestheticizing« to be  a po litica l s ta tem en t th a t  e ith e r  
accuses capitalism  and  com m unism  o f m oral ex h au stio n  o r exp lo its the  
advantages o f  affluent privacy within the capitalist p ro tec to ra te .
Rorty is perhaps the m ost inventive o f the »post-Nietzschean« an d  »post- 
Kan tian« cham pions o f aestheticizing, for Rorty m anages to jo in  H eidegger 
and Dewey in the liberal and dem ocratic spirit he  calls »irony.«34 T he Kantian 
th read  is far less explicit than  the N ietzschean; it is in any case m ed iated , in 
the liberal-dem ocratic spirit, by theorists such as Schiller an d  A dorno , as 
may be seen in the analyses and  generous proposals o ffered  by S husterm an  
a n d  W elsch. H e re , ben ign ly , c o n c e p tu a l a rb itra r in e s s  a p p e a rs  as th e  
a f f irm a tio n  o f p o litic a l eq u a lity  a n d  in c lu s iv e n e ss : r a p  m u sic  a n d  
environm ental concerns, for instance, testify to the  eclipse o f  elitist values. 
In a perfectly obvious sense, the liberal cast o f postm odernism  draws strength  
from  Dewey’s Art and Experience, w hich, in effect, is a d em ocratized  cousin 
o f Schiller’s vision o f aesthetic education.
34 See Rorty, »Private Irony and Liberal Hope.«
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Dewey, however, is no  postm odernist. N or is A dorno, o f course. Both, 
in  d iffe ren t ways, m ean  to preserve the relevance of co n tin u in g  to link the 
m o ra l a n d  th e  ae s th e tic , all the  while subverting  th e  s tro n g  co m p art- 
m en talization  o f objective (or at least universalized) ju d g m en t, according 
to Kant. T h e  dem arca tion  betw een the m oral and  the aesthetic dissolves in 
Dewey and  A dorno , b u t n e ith e r  denies the prospects o f objective practical 
ju d g m en t. T h e  subversive possibilities appear most saliently in Nietzsche, 
o f  course, ru n n in g  from  The Birth of Tragedy to The Gay Science to The Will to 
Power. N ietzsche’s th em e collects the artifactual, even self-deceptive (life- 
e n h a n c in g )  n a tu r e  o f  m o ra l an d  ae s th e tic  c o n c e rn s . In  J ü n g e r  a n d  
H e id eg g er, it tu rn s  im periously  p ro p h e tic  and  destinai; in A dorno  an d  
Dewey, it tu rns egalitarian, perhaps m ore critically in A dorno  than  in Dewey 
(th o u g h  one m ust rem em b er A d o rn o ’s m isreading o f  jazz). In N eham as 
an d  S husterm an  an d  W elsch, it becom es benignly to leran t: P roustian , in 
N eham as, n o t yet dem ocratic; alm ost W hitm anesque, in S husterm an and  
W elsch.
In  Rorty, the  dem ocratic  them e takes a distinctly postm odern ist tu rn  -  
which, politically, m eans th a t it veers off in a conserving, if n o t conservative, 
d irec tio n  in  th e  n am e of an  unspecified  »patriotism« said to be  m ore o f the 
L eft th an  o f the R ight.35 T h a t may even go som e distance toward explaining 
R orty’s yoking H eidegger an d  W ittgenstein and  Dewey, no  one o f whom  is 
a p ro p e r  p o stm o d ern is t, in  the nam e o f aestheticizing life; in fact, each 
opposes any th ing  like a K antian rationale o f practical ju d g m en t. I suspect 
tha t Rorty is genuinely postm odernist and the most prophetic o f this company: 
h e  has a »philosophical« conviction o f how to go on and has indeed prepared  
the g ro u n d  fo r a liberalized -  perhaps, better, a dem ocratized -  analogue 
(if you can im agine it) o f  H e id eg g er’s Volk vision, now no  longer ironic b u t 
m erely pa trio tic .36
T his h e lp s  to m ark  th e  slim sense in w hich the  aesthe tic iza tion  o f 
o rd in a ry  life is instinctively  m ean t to re o rien t o u r political sensibilities. 
P ostm odern ism  seem s to relieve us o f the need  for legitim ation; we yield in
3r' See Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). See, particularly, »The Inspirational Work 
of Great Works of Literature.«
3,i Rorty actually invokes H ölderlin ’s inspirational role in a way that suggests that the 
democratically m inded might use Hölderlin as well as Heidegger at his most benignly 
fascist moments: see Achieving Our Country, pp. 139-140. But that is of course the crazy 
quilt consequence of Rorty’s separating »hope« from »understanding«; see pp. 11,13, 
30-31. See also, for a sense of the Soviet analogue of Nazi aestheticization, Boris Groys, 
The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond, trans. Charles 
Rougle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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the direction  o f our habituated  impulses an d  are p leased to know th a t acting 
thus is self-certifying (revealed or privately au tonom ous) o r simply no  longer 
in need  o f the would-be objective scruple o f the  ph ilosophically  naive past. 
B ut th a t is a delusion -  a dangerous oversim plification  — th a t c a n n o t be 
satisfactorily opposed by any linking o f the m oral an d  the aesthetic th a t does 
n o t recogn ize  th a t leg itim ation  c a n n o t be m o re  th an  (b u t is a t least) a 
constructed  projection from  ou r own society’s practices.
T he aestheticizing them e is ultim ately a piece o f political opp o rtu n ism  
tha t senses th a t we find ourselves, at the  p re sen t tim e, som ew here betw een 
the repud ia tion  o f m oral and  political privilege an d  the b ew ild erm en t o f 
skepticism  and  conceptual anarchy. W hat we face is the  recovery o f critical 
ju d g m en t u n d er the condition o f changing history -  in  effect, the restoration  
o f a p rob lem  that had  already daw ned nearly  two h u n d re d  years ago. E ither 
aestheticizing bids us abandon the n eed  for legitim ation by way o f  refocusing 
the public impulses o f the »people« (w hether in  H eid eg g er’s way o r Rorty’s) 
o r assures us w ithout a rgum ent th a t the  aestheticizing  im pulse is reliably 
generous in the best dem ocratic sense (as with S husterm an  an d  W elsch). I 
find myself unwilling to trust e ither tendency and  believe, ra ther, th a t if there 
is a d isc ip lined  d eb a te  th a t may be m o u n ted , we will f in d  th a t we have 
reclaim ed the question o f m oral or ethical d irec tion  (however a lte red  from  
the K antian read ing), which would m ean  ou tflank ing  b o th  th e  revelatory 
and the postm odernist options once again -  w ithout falling back to m odern ist 
assurances.
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